Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 3

Article 5

1999

Tearing Down a Fence That is Hog Tight, Horse
High & (and) Bull Strong: The Supreme Court
Reshapes Jurisdiction of Local Telephone Markets
T. Jason White

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
T. J. White Tearing Down a Fence That is Hog Tight, Horse High & (and) Bull Strong: The Supreme Court Reshapes Jurisdiction of Local
Telephone Markets, 11 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 188 (1999).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol11/iss3/5

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review by
an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

CASE
NOTE
Tearing Down a Fence that is Hog Tight, Horse High &
Bull Strong: The Supreme Court Reshapes Jurisdiction
of Local Telephone Markets
by T. Jason White

I. INTRODUCTION
In a sweeping decision that shifts
control of local telephone markets from
the states and their regulatory agencies
to the United States and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC),
the Supreme Court in AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board reshaped local telephone
competition.' The Court ruled that the
FCC has jurisdiction to regulate
competition in local telephone markets
under the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (TCA).2 Once the Court dictated
that the FCC had jurisdiction to
regulate the TCA's mandates, it
applied the Chevron U.S.A., Incorporated
v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Incorporated3 standard to the FCC's
regulations of the TCA and found that
all but one were reasonable
interpretations of the statute.4
The TCA and Supreme Court's
decision in AT&T has broad
implications to consumers. At first
glance, the Court's ruling appears to
follow the spirit of the TCA by
accelerating competition in local
telephone markets. A closer look,
however, reveals that the decision and
the hawkish policies of the FCC do not
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benefit consumers; instead, the FCC's
regulations create a marketplace with
simulated rather than real competition.
Part II of this note discusses the history
of the telecommunications industry in
America and the goals of Congress in
passing the TCA. Part III discusses the
AT&T decision. Part IV analyzes the
AT&T decision as it interpreted the
TCA and as it applied the Chevron
standard to the FCC regulations. Part V
discusses the implications that the
decision and the FCC regulations will
have on consumers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Telecommunications
in America
Alexander Graham Bell
introduced the telephone in 1876.
Consequently, the American Telephone
& Telegraph (AT&T) monopoly was
quickly established, consisting of
AT&T, the local Bell Operating
Companies, and Western Electric.'
AT&T had the long distance market,
the local Bells had the local telephone
market, and Western Electric had the
telephone equipment market. Congress
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enacted the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 in response to AT&T's
monopoly.' Under the 1934 Act,
Congress transferred authority over
interstate communications from the
Interstate Commerce Commission to
the newly created FCC.7 States,
however, maintained control over
intrastate communications based on
Section 2(b), which states that "nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to
apply to or give the Commission [FCC]
jurisdiction with respect to... charges,
classifications, practices, services,
facilities, or regulations for or
connection with intrastate
communication service."'
In 1938, Congress amended the
Communications Act and granted the
FCC general rulemaking authority,
however, states maintained jurisdiction
over local telephone markets. 9 The
pertinent provisions of the 1938
amendments are Sections 201(a) and
201(b). Section 201(a) deals with
"interstate or foreign communication
by wire and radio." Section 201(b)
provides that "[tihe Commission may
prescribe such rules and regulations as
may be necessary in the public interest
to carry out the provisions of this
Act."'" The 1934 Act and the 1938
amendments proved ineffective in
regulating the AT&T monopoly."
The United States Department of
Justice continued to battle with the
monopoly and, in 1956, AT&T entered
into a Consent Decree divesting itself
in Western Electric but maintaining its
monopoly of the local and long
distance telephone markets. 2 Because

1999

AT&T was able to hold onto the most
valuable pieces of the monopoly,
namely, the local and long distance
telephone markets, its monopoly
power was unabated by the 1956
consent decree.
The Department of Justice
renewed its battles with A&T in 1974.
This resulted in the 1982 Modified
Final Judgment.13 The Modified Final
Judgment effectively ended the
monopoly of AT&T by completely
divesting them of the local telephone
market; it ended the collective reign of
the twenty two Bell Operating
Companies. 4 The Modified Final
Judgment allowed for seven surviving
independent Local Exchange Carriers
(LEC), each maintaining a monopoly
over a designated geographical area.
For example, Ameritech was created as
a provider of local telephone service in
the Midwest, US West provided
services in the Rocky Mountain
regions, and the five other LECs
divided up the remainder of the
country. 5
Until recently, the LECs were able
to maintain their monopolies because
the industry was considered to be a
natural monopoly. 6 The advent of
technologies allowing multiple
companies to use the same
telecommunication equipment and
facility eventually made the natural
monopoly theory out-of-date.
Responding to these technological
advancements, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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B. The Telecommunications Act of
1996
1. The Congressional
Mandates of the TCA
The TCA is intended to "promote
competition and reduce regulation in
order to secure lower prices and higher
quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications
technologies."17 The TCA fundamentally
restructures telephone markets to
"establish a national policy framework
designed to accelerate rapidly the private
sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information
technologies and services to all
Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to
competition ...... 18 Congress did not
address in the TCA whether the FCC
had jurisdiction to regulate the
mandates of the Act; however,
Congress expressly directed that the
TCA be inserted into the Communications
Act of 1934, which puts the TCA within
the provisions of the 1934 Act and the
1938 amendments. 19
The TCA binds the seven LECs,
such as Ameritech and US West, to a
host of duties designed to spur growth
by allowing competitors access to their
equipment.2 ° Competitors must use the
LECs network and equipment because
it is the only effective way for them to
enter local telephone markets. The
alternative would be for a competitor
to rewire a whole city with its own
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equipment, a duplicative and
tremendous waste of resources.
Competitors can access the LEC's
"network elements," which is defined
under the TCA as "a facility or
equipment used in the provision of a
telecommunications service. Such term
also includes features, functions, and
capabilities that are provided by means
of such facility or equipment ....
Once Congress defined the term
"network element" it mandated under
what circumstances a LECs "network
element" should be made available to a
requesting carrier. Section 251(d)(2)
requires that the FCC consider two
factors in determining if a network
element should be made available to a
requesting carrier: (1) whether access
to the requested network element is
necessary; and, (2) whether failure to
provide access to the network element
would impair the ability of the
requesting carrier to provide the
services that it seeks to offer (the
"necessary" and "impair" standards).22
Under the TCA, a requesting
carrier can obtain access to the LEC's
network in three ways: (1) by
purchasing local telephone services at
wholesale rates for resale to end users;
(2) by leasing elements of the LEC's
network on an unbundled basis; or (3)
by interconnecting its own facilities
with the LEC's network.3 A requesting
carrier and the LEC can negotiate an
agreement without regard to the above
mentioned duties. If negotiations fail,
however, either party can petition the
state commission that regulates local
telephone service to mediate and
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arbitrate the matter, subject to the TCA
and the FCC regulations.24
2. The FCC Regulations
Implementing the TCA
Six months after the 1996 Act was
passed, the FCC issued its First Report
and Order, which implemented the
local competition provisions. 25 The
FCC released rules that gave practical
effect to the TCA mandates by further
defining terms used in the Act and by
elucidating the "necessary" and
"impair" standards of section 251(d)(2).
Many of the rules implemented by the
FCC are at issue in the AT&T case.
The FCC established the pricing
system, known as Total Element Long
Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC), that
LECs must use in charging requesting
carriers for interconnection and
unbundled access to the LECs
equipment.2 6 TELRIC pricing is based
upon the cost of operating a
hypothetical network built with the
most efficient technology available. 7
Additionally, the FCC
prolumgated Rule 319, which listed
specific LEC services and equipments
that fall under the TCA's "network
element" definition.28 Rule 319 defines
"network element" to include operator
services, directory assistance,
operational support systems, vertical
switching functions such as caller I.D.,
call forwarding, and call waiting."29 In
addition to the broad definition of
"network element," the FCC made it
easier for requesting carriers to enter
the local telephone market by failing to
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adopt a facilities-ownership
requirement. The facilities-ownership
doctrine would have required a
requesting carrier to establish its own
facility and it could not have relied
solely on the LECs equipment to
conduct business.30
Rule 319 also clarified the
"necessary" and "impair" standards of
section 251(d)(2). Specifically, Rule 319
states that the "necessary" standard is
met regardless of whether requesting
carriers can obtain network elements
from a source other than the LEC.3 1
Rule 319 states that the "impair"
standard is met if the LEC's failure to
provide access to a network element
would decrease the quality, or increase
the cost, of the service a requesting
carrier seeks to offer, compared with
providing the service with the LEC's
network.32
Another area addressed by the
FCC was whether a LEC could
seperate already- combined network
elements before providing them to
requesting carriers. For example,
without a regulation a LEC could
seperate a vertical switching function
that had already- combined caller I.D.,
call forwarding, and call waiting into
one package because doing so would
make the requesting carrier re-combine
them. Rule 315(b) forbids LECs from
seperating any already-combined
network element.33 This is so because
of Section 251(c)(3) of the TCA, which
establishes the duty to provide access
to network elements on
nondiscriminatory rates, terms, and
conditions and in a manner that allows
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requesting carriers to combine the
elements. 34 The FCC interpreted
Section 251(c)(3) to mean that LECs
cannot separate already-combined
network elements before providing
them to requesting carriers.
Finally, FCC adopted Rule 809,
referred to as the "pick and choose"
rule.35 This rule requires LECs to make
available to a requesting carrier any
network element it has made available
to another requesting carrier at the
36
same rates, terms, and conditions.
Basically, requesting carriers can pick
and choose from all the LECs
agreements with other carriers on
terms advantageous to them.
The FCC State utility commissions
and LECs attacked the First Report and
Order, arguing that the FCC had no
jurisdiction to regulate local telephone
markets. The numerous cases
challenging the FCC's regulations were
consolidated in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.37 The
court held that the general rulemaking
authority conferred upon the FCC by
the Communications Act of 1934
extended only to interstate matters,
and that the FCC lacked the requisite
specific congressional authorization
needed to implement provisions of the
1996 Act addressing intrastate
telecommunications.38 The court found
nothing in the 1996 Act to overcome
the presumption that the states control
intrastate telecommunications, a
presumption which it described as a
fence that is "hog tight, horse high, and
bull strong, preventing the FCC from
intruding on the states' intrastate
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turf.
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Beyond jurisdiction, the LECs
challenged the substance of the FCC's
regulations. ° One of the regulations
the LEC challenged, Rule 319, sets
forth a minimum number of network
elements that LECs must make
available to requesting carriers.41 The
Court of Appeals disagreed with the
LECs and ruled that the FCC's
interpretations were reasonable and
hence lawful under Chevron.42
The Court of Appeals did rule in
favor of the LECs on two issues other
than jurisdiction.43 The court ruled that
Rule 315(b) went too far in forbidding
LECs to separate network elements
before leasing them to competitors. 44
The court also vacated the "pick and
choose" rule because, according to the
court, it would deter the "voluntary
negotiated agreements" that the 1996
Act favored.45
III. AT&T v. IOWA UTILITIES
BOARD
In AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, the
United States Supreme Court reversed
the Eighth Circuit on the jurisdictional
issue and ruled that the FCC does have
jurisdiction to regulate local telephone
markets. 46 The Court also held that the
FCC did not effectively consider the
"necessary" and "impair" standards of
§ 251(d)(2). Additionally, the Court did
agree with the Eighth Circuit that the
FCC reasonably omitted a facilitiesownership requirement. Yet, the Court
reversed the Court of Appeals on Rule
315, concluding that the FCC
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reasonably interpreted § 251(c)(3).
Finally, the Court also reversed the
Court of Appeals on the "pick and
choose" rule.47
A. The AT&T Decision Relating to
Jurisdiction
1. The Majority Opinion
The Court relied on Section
201(b), a 1938 amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934, in its
ruling that the FCC has jurisdiction to
regulate intrastate telecommunications
pursuant to the 1996 Act.' Section
201(b) states that "[tihe Commission
may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the
provisions of this Act."4 9 The Court
found that "[slince Congress expressly
directed that the 1996 Act, along with
its localcompetition provisions, be
inserted into the Communications Act
of 1934... the Commission's
rulemaking authority would seem to
extend to implementation of the localcompetition provisions. 50
The Court rejected the LEC's
argument that § 201(a) of the 1938
amendment limits the general
rulemaking authority of § 201(b)
because subsection (a) deals solely with
interstate and foreign matters.5
According to the Court, the qualifier
"interstate or foreign," which limits the
class of common carriers with the duty
of providing communication service,
reaches forward into the last sentence
of § 201(b) to limit the class of
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provisions that the Commission has
52
authority to implement.
The Court was also unpersuaded
by Section 152(b), a provision from the
1934 Act. Section 152(b) states that,
except for Sections 223 through 227 and
Section 332, "nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to apply or to give
the Commission jurisdiction with
respect to ...charges, classifications,
practices, services, facilities, or
regulations for or in connection with
intrastate communication service...
."I' The LECs pointed out that the local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act
are not identified in the except clause
in section 152(b); therefore, the effect of
the "nothing... shall be construed"
provision is to require an explicit
application to intrastate service and an
explicit grant of FCC jurisdiction.54
The Court rejected this argument,
again relying on the general
rulemaking authority of section
5 The Court stated that "[flor
201(b)..
even though 'Commission jurisdiction'
always follows where the Act 'applies,'
Commission jurisdiction (so-called
'ancillary' jurisdiction) could exist even
56
where the Act does not 'apply."'
Accordingly, "[tihe term 'apply' limits
the substantive reach of the statute...
and the phrase 'or give the
Commission jurisdiction' limits, in
addition, the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction. 57
The LECs next argued that specific
provisions of the Act give state
commissions jurisdiction and that
several FCC rules should therefore be
voided.58 One such provision is section
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252(c), which states that "[in resolving
by arbitration under subsection (b) any
open issues and imposing conditions
upon the parties to the agreement, a
state commission shall ... establish any
rates for interconnection, services, or
network elements ... . 59The Court
admitted that there is a "lack of
parallelism" between subsection (c)(1),
which adds "including the regulations
prescribed by the Commission
pursuant to Section 251" whereas
subsection (c)2) says nothing about
Commission regulations applicable to
subsection (d).6 ° The Court explained
this lack of parallelism by stating that
Section 251 specifically requires the
Commission to promulgate regulations
implementing Section 251, whereas
61
subsection (d) of section 252 does not.
The Court concluded that "lilt seems to
us not peculiar that the mandated
regulations should be specifically
referenced, whereas regulations
permitted pursuant to the
Commission's section 201(b) authority
62
are not.
Finally, the Court reversed the
Court of Appeal's determinations that
the FCC had no jurisdiction to
promulgate rules regarding state
review of pre-existing interconnection
agreements between LECs and other
carriers. 63 The Court again relied on the
general rulemaking authority of
section 201(b).
2. The Dissents
Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer
dissented with respect to the
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jurisdictional aspect of the majority's
decision. Justice Breyer discussed how
the history of local telecommunications
from the 1982 Modified Final Judgment
to the 1996 TCA demonstrates that
Congress intended for states to
regulate local telephone markets.
Justice Thomas' dissent discussed the
well established rules of statutory
construction that compel a contrary
decision. Taken together, the dissents
offer a complete and persuasive
argument that jurisdiction of intrastate
communications should remain with
the states.
Justice Breyer argued that the
1996 Act does not give the FCC
authority to regulate local telephone
markets because "(1) a century of
regulatory history establishes state
authority as the local telephone service
rate making norm and (2) the 1996 Act
nowhere changes, or creates an
exception to, that norm." 64
According to Justice Breyer, the
TCA attempts to establish local
competition without wasteful
duplication of facilities. The TCA does
not, however, purport to explain how
exactly to obtain that goal; the TCA
simply eliminates legal barriers to local
competition.5 Justice Breyer concluded
that state regulatory commissions have
a better understanding of each unique
local market and can effectively
regulate the new competitive market
by establishing realistic rates,
consequently, they should maintain
jurisdiction.' Justice Breyer reasoned
that "local regulators have experience
setting rates that recover both the
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immediate, smaller, added costs that
demand for additional service imposes
upon a local system, and also a proper
share of the often huge fixed costs...
and overhead needed to provide the
67
dial tone itself.
Justice Breyer also explained that
the experience of local regulators
"along with the fact that the relevant
technology changes rapidly, argue in
favor of, not against, local rate-setting
control, including local rate-setting
differences, for those differences can
amount to the kind of
'experimentation' long thought a
strength of our federal system."" Only
in light of the purposes of the TCA can
an effective regime of cooperation
between state and federal regulatory
commissions be created: "ITihe Act's
language more clearly foresees
retention, not replacement, of the
traditional allocation of state-federal
rate-setting authority."69
Justice Thomas' dissent, in which
Justice Breyer and Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined, relied on both the
well established principles of statutory
construction 7 and section 152(b), a
section from the 1934 Act that limits
federal jurisdiction to exclude
intrastate matters. He concluded that
Congress intended for states to
maintain regulation of local
telecommunications. 7'
Justice Thomas pointed out that
Section 152(b) has been closely
guarded by the Supreme Court because
it is a codification of a "historical
jurisdictional division" of regulatory
telecommunications. 72 In Louisiana
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Public Service Commission v. FCC, the
Court held that section 152(b)
precluded the FCC from preempting
state regulations.7 3 The Court stated
that section 152(b) "fences off from the
FCC reach and regulation intrastate
matters-indeed, including matters in
connection with intrastate service" and
that the FCC could breach 152(b)'s
jurisdictional fence only when
Congress used "unambiguous or
straightforward" language to give it
jurisdiction over intrastate
communications."74 Justice Thomas
concluded that the jurisdictional
challenge contravenes the division of
authority set forth in the 1996 Act and
disregards the 100-year tradition of
state authority over intrastate
telecommunications. 75
B. The AT&T Decision Relating to
the FCC Regulations
Once the Court got over the
jurisdictional hurdle, it analyzed the
FCC's regulations relating to the TCA
under the Chevron standard of
reasonableness. Specifically, the Court
ruled, first that the FCC's rules
governing unbundled access are
reasonable, with the exception of Rule
319; and second, that the FCC's "pick
and choose" rule was reasonable.76
Justice Souter disagreed with the Court
that Rule 319 was unreasonable and he
filed a dissent to that issue only.7 The
Court did not address the merits of the
FCC's TELRIC pricing system because
it was not ruled on by the Court of
Appeals.78
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The first challenge to the FCC's
unbundling rules was that the FCC
included features and services that do
not meet the statutory definition of
"network element." 79 The FCC
included operator services, directory
assistance, operational support
systems, caller I.D., call forwarding,
and call waiting as services that fall
under the definition of "network
elements." 0
The Court ruled that the FCC's
rule interpreting the definition of
"network element" was reasonable in
so much as a "network element" need
not be a physical facility or
equipment.8 1 According to the Court,
operator services and directory
assistance are "features, functions, and
capabilities" of a network element. 2
The Court turned next to FCC
Rule 319, which requires a LEC to
provide requesting carriers with access
to a minimum of seven network
elements; if a requesting carrier wants
access to additional elements it must
petition the state commission. 3 Rule
319 interprets Section 251(d)(2) of the
TCA, which provides that in
determining what network elements
should be made available, the
Commission shall consider whether
"access to such network elements... is
necessary" and "the failure to provide
access to such network elements would
impair the ability of the
telecommunications carrier seeking
access to provide the services that it
seeks to offer."'
The Court ruled that Rule 319
was unreasonable and vacated the rule
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because it did not consider the
"necessary" and "impair" standards of
Section 251(d)(2). 5 The Court reasoned
that Rule 319 read the two standards
out of the statute. For example, the
FCC reported in its First Report and
Order that it would consider the
"impair" standard met if "the failure of
an incumbent to provide access to the
network element would decrease the
quality, or increase the financial or
administrative cost of the service a
requesting carrier seeks to offer,
compared with providing that service
over other unbundled elements in the
incumbent's LEC's network." 6 The
Court disagreed: "Since any entrant
will request the most efficient network
element that the incumbent has to
offer, it is hard to imagine when the
incumbent's failure to give access to
the element would not constitute an
impairment under this standard." 7
Notably, the Court expressly failed
to adopt the "essential facilities"
doctrine to the "necessary" and
"impair" standards. 8 Adopting that
doctrine would have required
requesting carriers to use only those
facilities of the incumbent that are
essential for it to conduct business,
putting the onus on requesting carriers
to seek out and establish facilities
available elsewhere. 9
The Court next addressed the "all
elements" rule, which allows
competitors to provide local phone
service relying solely on the elements
in an incumbent's network.' The
incumbents argued that to access their
networks, a requesting carrier must
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own its own facility.91 The Court
rejected this argument and concluded
that the TCA suggests that a requesting
carrier could rely solely on a LEC's
facilities by "requiring in [Section]
251(c)(3) that LECs provide access to
'any' requesting carrier." 92 Accordingly,
the Court ruled that the FCC was
reasonable in not imposing a
facilitiesownership requirement.
Next, the Court addressed FCC
Rule 315(b), which forbids LECs from
separating alreadycombined network
elements before leasing them to a
competitor.93 The FCC explained that
this rule is designed so that LECs
cannot "disconnect previously
connected elements, over the objection
of the requesting carrier, not for any
productive reason, but just to impose
wasteful reconnection costs on new
entrants."94 The Court concluded that
the FCC was reasonable because, in the
absence of Rule 315(b), incumbents
could impose wasteful costs on those
carriers who requested less than the
whole network. 95
Finally, the Court ruled that the
FCC's "pick and choose" rule was
reasonable.96 The "pick and choose"
rule requires the LEC to "make
available.., to any requesting
telecommunications carrier any
individual interconnection, service, or
network element arrangement
contained in any agreement to which it
is a party that is approved by a state
commission.., upon the same rates,
terms, and conditions as those
provided in the agreement. 97 The
LECs argued that this rule threatens
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the give-and-take of negotiations
because every agreement they make
with one competitor must be available
to all others.98 A competitor will
literally be able to pick and choose
provisions from each agreement that
benefits it. Without getting to the
substance of that argument, the Court
ruled that the FCC's rule is reasonable
under Chevron.
To summarize, the Supreme Court,
in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, ruled
that the FCC has jurisdiction, based on
Section 201(b) of the TCA, to
promulgate rules effecting intrastate
telecommunications. The Court
vacated Rule 319, in as much as the
FCC did not consider Section
251(d)(2)'s "necessary" and "impair"
standards. The Court ruled that all the
other FCC's rules relating to the TCA
were reasonable, including omitting a
facilities-ownership requirement;
interpreting the definition of "network
element" to include non-physical
elements such as call waiting and
directory assistance; forbidding LECs
to separate already-combined network
elements; and adopting a "pick and
choose" rule allowing competitors to
have access to any agreement the LEC
entered into with another carrier.'
IV. ANALYSIS
As Justice Thomas' dissent
effectively demonstrated, the Court
erred in ruling that the FCC has
jurisdiction, under the TCA, to regulate
local telephone markets. The Court,
faced with the constrictions of Chevron,
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properly determined that the FCC's
regulations were reasonable
interpretations of the TCA; however,
the FCC has promulgated rules that,
left unrevised, will create a simulated
instead of real competition in local
telephone markets.
A. Jurisdiction
Taken together, the Thomas and
Breyer dissents present a strong
argument that Congress never
intended to usurp state commissions'
regulatory duties of intrastate
telecommunications. The Court itself
spoke convincingly of this matter in
Louisiana Public Service Commission and
established that the state's
jurisdictional fence could be breached
only when Congress uses
"unambiguous or straightforward"
language to give it jurisdiction over
intrastate communications.' 0 This
position is further verified by Justice
Thomas' statutory construction
analysis.
Section 201(b) states that "[t]he
Commission may prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary in
the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this chapter."'' As Justice
Thomas points out, the statutory
construction principle of ejusdem
generis that Section 201(b) only applies
to that which proceeded it. Ejusdem
generis means that when a general
term follows a specific one, the general
term should be understood as a
reference to subjects akin to the one
with the specific enumeration.'02
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Applying the ejusdem generis
principle to this case, Section 201(b)
does not announce a broad
jurisdictional grant to the FCC on all
matters relating to the TCA.
Specifically, Section 201(b) applies to
matters enunciated in Section 201(a),
the immediately proceeding
subsection. That subsection refers
exclusively to "interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio" and
the first sentence of 201(b) refers to
"charges, practices, classifications, and
regulations for and in connection with
10 3
such communication service.
In addition, Section 152(b) is
written in the disjunctive. As Justice
Thomas states, "canons of construction
ordinarily suggest that terms
connected by a disjunctive by given
separate meanings, unless the context
dictates otherwise ... ."104 Applying
that principle to 152(b), the majority's
interpretation "necessarily implies that
Congress sub silentio rendered .. ." the
statute a nullity.
Indeed Section 152(b), which reads
"nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply to or to give the
Commission jurisdiction with respect
to (intrastate telecommunications)"
becomes a dead letter because the
majority gives the FCC jurisdiction, in
Section 201(b) over all matters relating
to the TCA; therefore, applying the
majority's holding to the TCA,
Congress now must expressly give
state commissions jurisdiction.

B. The FCC Regulations
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Because, under Chevron, federal
agency regulations will not be vacated
unless they are unreasonable, the
Court's rulings on the FCC regulations
were appropriate. Aside from judicial
review, the FCC regulations should be
held to the highest level of scrutiny
because there is not another model
available for comparison in real world
situations. Unfortunately for
consumers, the FCC regulations do not
hold up well. The "necessary" and
"impair" standards of Rule 319 must
be given more consideration and effect
to properly provide for a realistic
competitive marketplace. Also, the pick
and choose rule should be vacated
because LECs lose the ability to
negotiate unique provisions and
contracts with requesting carriers. 10 5
Finally, although not before the Court
in AT&T, the FCC's TELRIC pricing
scheme should be discarded and
replaced with a more realistic and
historically-proven pricing system.
The TCA provides that in
determining what network elements
should be made available to a
requesting carrier, the FCC shall
consider whether access to the network
element is necessary and whether
failure to provide access to the network
element would impair the ability of the
requesting carrier to provide services it
seeks to offer.10 6 The FCC, in Rule 319,
gutted the "necessary" and "impair"
standards and the Court correctly
vacated Rule 319. The Court failed,
however, to adopt the "essential
facilities" doctrine to the TCA 10 7 which
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establishes liability on the monopolist
who denies a competitor access to a
resource essential for competition in a
10 8
relevant antitrust market.
By adopting the doctrine under
the TCA, the FCC could establish a
mechanism by which requesting
carriers can share necessary
equipment. It would be presumed that
certain equipment under the control of
the incumbent LEC would be
necessary, thereby impairing a
requesting carrier to enter the local
telephone market without it. By
adopting the essential facilities
doctrine, the FCC can effectively
establish what equipment the
presumption would apply to, and,
consequently, eliminate needless
administration and litigation. On the
other hand, incumbent LECs would
not have to provide other equipment to
a requesting carrier unless the
requesting carrier could show why it
needed it under the "necessary" and
"impair" standard.
The goal in adopting the essential
facilities doctrine is to allow requesting
carriers access to equipment they could
not, without wasteful reproduction, get
otherwise. Conversely, requesting
carriers should not be able to rely on
equipment and services of incumbent
LECs that the competitor can get
elsewhere, albeit at higher costs. The
doctrine is not intended for
competitors to enter a previously
monopolized industry and reap
artificial profits from a simulated
market designed only to appear
competitive.
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The FCC should adopt a narrow
essential facilities doctrine that imparts
on LECs to provide necessary
equipment to requesting carriers. The
FCC should strictly adhere to this
doctrine in establishing only those
services and equipment necessary to
conduct business in the local telephone
market. Requesting carriers should not,
however, be able to have access to any
equipment or service that they could
get in other ways. Unlike Rule 319,
which allowed requesting carriers
access to a significant portion of the
LEC's equipment, the essential
facilities doctrine creates real
competition.
An additional way to create a
reality-based market is for the FCC to
vacate its "pick and choose" rule.
Currently, LECs must provide to any
requesting carrier the same terms and
conditions it provides other carriers. In
other words, a requesting carrier may
review all agreements between the
incumbent LEC and other carriers and
pick and choose the ones that benefit it.
LECs are placed in the awkward
position of negotiating with a
requesting carrier, knowing that any
agreement they reach will be available
to all other carriers. LECs will be
unable to trade off network element
terms or services against provisions
unrelated to the TCA.
Companies in stronger positions to
enter the local telephone market
should be able to do so unimpeded by
unnecessary barriers to entry. As
discussed previously, LECs cannot
discriminate when it comes to essential
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facilities; however, companies and
LECs should have the freedom to
negotiate deals relating to other
equipment and services not deemed
essential to entry in the local telephone
market. These types of agreements
should not only be allowed but
encouraged. A LEC, knowing that its
monopoly power has been eliminated
by the TCA, will want to secure the
best possible agreements in
anticipation of decreased profits and
will begin to diversify into other
markets. Companies entering the local
telephone market will want to use
whatever assets they have available to
enter a market with monopolistic
profits. The exchange of assets between
companies and LECs would allow for
quicker entry into the market with
limited regulatory interference.
Finally, the FCC should discard
the TELRIC pricing system. 109 As
indicated earlier, the FCC requires that
LECs charge requesting carriers access
to their network elements based on
"Total Element Long Run Incremental
Cost." 110 TELRIC pricing is based upon
the cost of operating a hypothetical
network built with the most efficient
technology available."' The TELRIC
pricing scheme fails in that it does not
consider historical and realistic costs of
the provided equipment or services.
Incumbent LECs are essentially
penalized for not maintaining the most
update equipment and not maintaining
an efficient and streamlined operation.
The FCC need not do this when market
forces will weed out weaker LECs. 2
For example, assume an
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incumbent LEC in Florida has failed to
reinvest in equipment and services for
many years. A requesting carrier
would have to pay the historical cost of
that equipment and service, which
conceedingly, may be higher than what
another requesting carrier is paying in
California. The Florida LEC, if not
reinvesting in equipment and services,
probably does not do other things well
either, such as marketing and sales.
The new entrant into the market will, if
aggressive, overtake the incumbent
LEC through more innovative
marketing and higher services in other
areas. It is here that the LEC will be
penalized, through natural market
forces.
Conversely, a new market entrant
that receives artificially lower prices
because of TELRIC will be at an
advantage over LECs without having
to do the things that in other nonregulatory markets would be required
for success. By requiring the LEC to
provide equipment and services at
lower than cost prices to the new
entrant profits are being artificially
shifted from the LEC to the new
entrant. The consumer will be
penalized by the misguided TELRIC
pricing scheme because new entrants
will reap artificial profits and will not
have the incentive to invest in newer
equipment or better services.
V. IMPACT
A recent article suggested Illinois
consumers are overcharged $600
million a year because of insufficient

1999

competition in the local telephone
market."3 The benefits of competition
as envisioned by Congress will not be
felt by consumers for many years
because of the Court's decision in
AT&T and the policies of the FCC. The
national restructuring of the local
telephone market will not have the
advantage of experimentation and
diversity inherent in cooperative
federalism regimes. Now the consumer
will be wholly reliant on the FCC, an
agency too aggressive in its approach
and unwilling to allow even a
semblance of market forces to help
shape the newly-competitive local
telephone market.
Consumers will be adversely
affected by the decision to shift
regulatory control from the states to
the federal agencies. Allowing the
states to regulate local telephone
competition essentially creates many
different models and approaches in
varying markets. A model that did not
work in California negatively effects
Californian consumers but the rest of
the country is spared of the flawed
approach. Conversely, a model that is
working in one state can be imitated by
other states. This trial and error
approach has been used in other areas
14
of law effectively.
An approach of this nature calls
for cooperation between Congress,
state regulatory agencies, and federal
courts. This cooperative federalism
approach to the TCA is more fully
discussed by Philip Weiser in his
article, Chevron, CooperativeFederalism,
and Telecommunications Reform.' 5 Mr.
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Weiser wisely quoted the words of
Justice Jackson, dissenting in a
Supreme Court decision that took
authority away from the states to
regulate utilities:
Congress may well have believed
that diversity of experimentation
in the field of regulation has values
which centralization and
uniformity destroy .... Long before
the Federal Government could be
stirred to regulate utilities,
courageous states took the initiative
and almost the whole body of
utility practice has resulted from
their experiences .... It must be
remembered that closer than any
federal agency to those they
regulate and to their customers are
the state authorities, whose
mechanisms are less cumbersome
and whose principles can much
more quickly be adjusted to the
changing times. We should not
utilize the centralizing powers of
the federal judiciary to destroy
diversities between states which
Congress has been scrupulous to
protect. If now and then some state
does not regulate its utilities
according to the federal standard, it
may be small price to pay for
preserving the state initiative which
gave us utilities regulation far in
advance of federal initiative." 6
The appearance of competition
does not, in the long run, lower costs to
consumers. That can only be done
through the creation of actual
competition, which is created only
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where competitors create their own
company, with their own services,
marketing plan, and sales staff and rely
on the monopolist only for equipment
otherwise unavailable.
A simulated market is just that,
artificial and fake, and requesting
carriers are not really competing in the
local telephone market. A company
reaping profits from the ingenuity and
entrepreneurial spirit of another
company will not bring added value to
that industry. Knowing the fruits of his
research and development are being
shared with other, less talented
companies, the monopolist will no
longer have the incentive to spend
money and resources on that area of its
business. It will, instead, spend more
money on lobbying efforts to get laws
passed to protect itself. The undue
transactional and lobbying cost of
doing business takes away
opportunities for companies to invest
in updated equipment and research.
These types of investments benefit
consumers through added value in
products, services, or lower prices.
Conversely, companies
bootstrapping on to monopolists never
had the incentive to spend money on
research and development in the first
place: they relied on the monopolist's
research and development. New
companies will not be offering
anything to the newly opened industry
except for the appearance of
competition. A market simulated to
have competition is no better off than a
monopoly market that is highly
regulated. Indeed, a simulated market
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is arguably worse because the
monopolist invests less in its industry.

from real competition and will pay for
simulated competition.

VI.

Endnotes

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, in AT&T v.
Iowa Utilities Board, failed to adopt a
cooperative federalism regime for the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Instead, the FCC will have regulatory
control on matters relating to
competition in local telephone markets.
Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas
demonstrate that Congress did not
intend for this result. The opportunity
for state agencies to regulate the TCA's
mandates would have allowed
experimentation and diversity so that
models and approaches could have
been tried in smaller markets before
exposing the nation's consumers to
them.
The FCC's hawkish policies, as
reflected in the regulations relating to
the TCA, demonstrate that consumers
will benefit from the TCA only when
regulatory subsidies are eliminated
and, as in other industries, market
forces dictate which companies
survive. Now that technology allows
for competition in local telephone
markets, governmental policies should
allow a natural progression of new
entrants who rely on good business to
gain marketshare. New entrants should
be allowed access to only the LEC
equipment and services that are
essential to conduct business. The price
charged for the equipment and services
should reflect historical and actual
costs. In short, consumers will benefit
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